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Essay 
Abolition Constitutionalism and Non-Reformist 
Reform: The Case for Ending Pretrial Detention 
RENÉ REYES 
The prison abolition movement encompasses a range of objectives and 
perspectives. While dismantling the carceral system may be the ultimate 
goal, incremental steps can be an important component of this long-term 
project. This Essay makes a case for the constitutional elimination of 
pretrial detention as one part of an incremental abolitionist agenda. The 
analysis pays particular attention to the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial 
Court’s recent decision in Commonwealth v. Lougee, which illustrates some 
of the ways in which the COVID-19 crisis has exacerbated preexisting 
injustices and inequities in the pretrial detention system. Although Lougee 
itself affords only limited avenues of relief for unconvicted individuals 
languishing in custody, the decision nevertheless highlights the important 
role that state constitutional law can play in advancing the cause of 
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Abolition Constitutionalism and Non-Reformist 
Reform: The Case for Ending Pretrial Detention 
RENÉ REYES * 
INTRODUCTION 
Prison abolition is a long-term project that encompasses a range 
of objectives and perspectives.1 While many abolitionists may share 
the goal of dismantling the carceral system and the broader prison 
industrial complex,2 they may differ over the most productive means 
of achieving those ends. The use of constitutional law in the abolition 
movement is an instructive example. As University of Pennsylvania 
Carey Law School Professor Dorothy Roberts has observed, some 
activists “not only have eschewed constitutional law as a means to 
achieve prison abolition but also have argued that constitutional law 
serves to facilitate and legitimate state violence against black and 
other marginalized people.”3 But Professor Roberts has also offered a 
more optimistic assessment of constitutional law’s capacity to help 
“build a society based on principles of freedom, equal humanity, and 
democracy—a society that has no need for prisons.”4 Incremental 
steps can be an important part of this process.5 Similarly, 
“non-reformist reforms” can also be important.6 Such measures do not 
 
* Assistant Professor, Suffolk University Law School; A.B. Harvard College, J.D. Harvard Law 
School. I thank Erin Braatz, Stephen Cody, Chris Dearborn, and Maurice Dyson for thoughtful comments 
on an earlier draft. I also extend particular thanks to Sarah Reyes, whose work on prison abolition and 
passion for social justice inspired me to write this Essay.  
1 See, e.g., Dorothy E. Roberts, Foreword: Abolition Constitutionalism, 133 HARV. L. REV. 1, 6–8 
(2019) (noting that activists “have resisted ‘closed definitions of prison abolitionism’ and have instead 
suggested a variety of terms to capture what prison abolitionists think and do”); Allegra M. McLeod, 
Envisioning Abolition Democracy, 132 HARV. L. REV. 1613, 1617–18 (2019) (surveying various visions 
of abolition). 
2 See Roberts, supra note 1, at 6 (discussing origins of the term “prison industrial complex”). 
3 Id. at 8. 
4 Id. at 110. 
5 See id. at 108 (“[P]rison abolitionists acknowledge that building a prisonless society is a long-
term project involving incremental achievements.”). See also Allegra M. McLeod, Prison Abolition and 
Grounded Justice, 62 UCLA L. REV. 1156, 1161 (2015) (“[A]bolition may be understood . . . as a gradual 
project of decarceration, in which radically different legal and institutional regulatory forms supplant 
criminal law enforcement.”). 
6 See RUTH WILSON GILMORE, GOLDEN GULAG: PRISONS, SURPLUS, CRISIS, AND OPPOSITION IN 
GLOBALIZING CALIFORNIA 242 (2007) (describing non-reformist reforms as “changes that, at the end of 
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aim to increase the efficiency or legitimacy of the prison industrial 
complex, but rather to “reduce the power of an oppressive system while 
illuminating the system’s inability to solve the crises it creates.”7  
This Essay makes a case for the constitutional abolition of pretrial 
detention as part of an incremental, non-reformist reform agenda. The 
analysis pays particular attention to the Massachusetts Supreme 
Judicial Court’s recent decision in Commonwealth v. Lougee, which 
illustrates some of the ways in which the ongoing COVID-19 crisis 
has exacerbated preexisting injustices and inequities in the pretrial 
detention system.8 I argue that while Lougee itself affords only limited 
avenues of relief for unconvicted individuals languishing in custody, 
the decision nevertheless highlights the role that state constitutional 
law can potentially play in advancing the cause of abolition when 
federal constitutional law falls short.   
I. RACIAL BIAS AND PRETRIAL DETENTION 
In 2018, Senator Elizabeth Warren declared before an audience at 
Dillard University that the U.S. criminal justice system is “racist . . . 
front to back.”9 While Warren received considerable criticism for her 
remarks,10 racial bias in the criminal justice system is pervasive and 
amply documented. For instance, a 2015 study by the Sentencing 
Project found that people of color face disparities at every stage of the 
criminal process: they are more likely than whites to be arrested, to be 
harshly charged, to be convicted, and to face longer sentences—“all 
after accounting for relevant legal differences such as crime severity 
and criminal history.”11 Similarly, a 2020 report from the Bureau of Justice 
Statistics showed that Black and Hispanic people continue to be imprisoned 
 
the day, unravel rather than widen the net of social control through criminalization”); K. Sabeel Rahman 
& Jocelyn Simonson, The Institutional Design of Community Control, 108 CALIF. L. REV. 679, 695 
(2020) (citing Gilmore’s definition). 
7 Roberts, supra note 1, at 114 (internal quotations omitted).   
8 Commonwealth v. Lougee, 147 N.E.3d 464, 468, 476 (Mass. 2020).   
9 Bill Barrow, Elizabeth Warren Calls US Criminal Justice System ‘Racist,’ BOS. GLOBE (Aug. 4, 
2018, 3:06 PM), https://www.bostonglobe.com/news/nation/2018/08/04/warren-calls-criminal-justice-
system-racist/B6mdqVFWRPQfVDJ03S02yL/story.html. 
10 Laura Crimaldi, Police Chiefs Criticize Elizabeth Warren for Calling Criminal Justice System 
‘Racist,’ BOS. GLOBE (Aug. 11, 2018, 6:55 PM), https://www.bostonglobe.com/metro/2018/08/11/poli
ce-chiefs-criticize-warren-for-calling-criminal-justice-system-racist/Jz4PJJhfeFS3iVYD8KLsPN/story. 
11 NAZGOL GHANDNOOSH, THE SENTENCING PROJECT, BLACK LIVES MATTER: ELIMINATING 
RACIAL INEQUITY IN THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 12 (2015), http://sentencingproject.org/doc/publi
cations/rd_Black_Lives_Matter.pdf. See also Paul Butler, The System Is Working the Way It Is Supposed 
to: The Limits of Criminal Justice Reform, 104 GEO. L.J. 1419, 1427 (2016) (discussing disparities and 
citing Sentencing Project study). 
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at much higher rates than whites.12 Professor Paul Butler has argued that 
such statistics do not merely represent “problems” in the criminal justice 
system, “but are instead integral features of policing and punishment in the 
United States. They are how the system is supposed to work.”13 Stated 
plainly, much of American criminal procedure jurisprudence over the past 
several decades “evidence[s] a racial project by the U.S. Supreme Court to 
allow the police to control African-American men.”14 Dorothy Roberts 
draws a similar conclusion, writing that “criminal procedure and punishment 
in the United States still function to maintain forms of racial subordination 
that originated in the institution of slavery—despite the dominant 
constitutional narrative that those forms of subordination were abolished.”15 
The kinds of racial disparities that characterize the criminal justice 
system in general are also present in the pretrial detention context in 
particular.16 University of Alabama School of Law Professor Jenny Carroll 
has noted that since the passage of state and federal bail reform statutes in 
the 1980s, “rates of pretrial detention across the nation have continued to 
rise and to disproportionately affect poor and minority populations.”17 In 
Massachusetts, for example, recent analyses of state and county statistics 
show that people of color are detained pretrial at levels highly 
disproportionate to their share of the population.18 An April 2020 report 
indicated that Black and Hispanic people each made up more than 20% of 
the pretrial detention populations in Massachusetts Department of 
Corrections facilities,19 despite the fact that those communities respectively 
constitute only 9% and 12% of the state’s population as a whole.20 The 
disparities are even more extreme in some county jail facilities, where Black 
detainees have been overrepresented relative to their share of the local 
population by factors as high as ten to one.21 
The consequences of such detention can be extreme. Professor Roberts 
has discussed some of the ways in which the criminal justice system 
“extends its subordinating impact beyond prison walls by imposing 
 
12 E. ANN CARSON, BUREAU OF JUST. STATS., U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., PRISONERS IN 2018, (2020), 
https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/p18.pdf. 
13 Butler, supra note 11, at 1425. 
14 Id. at 1450. 
15 Roberts, supra note 1, at 4. 
16 See Jenny E. Carroll, Pretrial Detention in the Time of COVID-19, 115 NW. U. L. REV. ONLINE 
59, 69–71 (2020) (discussing racial bias and its disproportionate impact in pretrial detention). 
17 Id. at 70. 
18 MASS. DEP’T OF CORR., PRISON POPULATION TRENDS 2019 18 (2020), https://www.mass.gov/l
ists/prison-population-trends. 
19 Id. 
20 QuickFacts: Massachusetts, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU (Jul. 1, 2019), https://www.census.gov/quic
kfacts/MA. 
21 See Alexander Jones & Benjamin Forman, Exploring the Potential for Pretrial Innovation in 
Massachusetts, MASSINC 2 (2015), https://massinc.org/research/exploring-the-potential-for-pretrial-
for-pretrial-innovation-in-massachusetts/. 
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collateral penalties that deny critical rights and resources to formerly 
incarcerated people,”22 and it should be emphasized that the collateral effects 
of pretrial detention will be suffered by individuals who are legally 
presumed to be innocent and may not be factually guilty of any offenses at 
all. There are obvious costs to those held in custody themselves: lost wages, 
interrupted family relationships, barriers to participation in the preparation 
of one’s own defense, and reduced access to mental health and addiction 
services.23 Perhaps less obviously, there are also costs to the broader 
community. As highlighted by Professor Carroll, the community “not only 
loses one of its own, but also loses all of the benefits of that defendant’s 
presence. In custody, defendants do not earn a wage to support their families 
or pay their rent. They are absentee parents, partners, and mentors.”24 Just 
as importantly, “pretrial detention serves to disrupt and destroy the very ties 
between defendants and their communities that might, in the long run, 
protect and promote community safety.”25 In other words, pretrial detention 
is antithetical to abolition’s twin goals of dismantling unjust carceral 
institutions while simultaneously building toward a more fair and equitable 
collective life in which policing and prisons are unnecessary.26  
II. THE LIMITS OF CURRENT DOCTRINE 
Current constitutional doctrine makes challenges to pretrial detention 
difficult. Indeed, it may be an apt illustration of Professor Roberts’s 
observation “that so much of the Supreme Court’s constitutional 
jurisprudence since its inception in the slavery era has been 
anti-abolitionist.”27 The leading case is United States v. Salerno.28 There, the 
defendant brought a facial challenge to the federal Bail Reform Act of 1984, 
arguing that it violated both the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause and 
the Eighth Amendment’s Excessive Bail Clause by allowing for pretrial 
detention based on a judicial finding of future dangerousness.29 The Court 
rejected both constitutional arguments.30 With respect to Due Process, the 
majority held that pretrial detention was not necessarily a “punishment” 
imposed without benefit of a trial, but rather a permissible “regulatory” 
measure designed to further the government’s legitimate goal of preventing 
 
22 Roberts, supra note 1, at 37. 
23 See Carroll, supra note 16, at 71 (describing the “downstream consequences” of pretrial 
detention). 
24 Id. 
25 Id. at 72. 
26 See McLeod, supra note 1, at 1617–20 (highlighting the relationship between deconstructive and 
world-bulding elements of prison abolition); Roberts, supra note 1, at 43–48 (discussing the same). 
27 Roberts, supra note 1, at 8.   
28 481 U.S. 739 (1987). 
29 Id. at 746. 
30 Id. at 755. 
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danger to the community.31 As to the Eighth Amendment argument, the 
Court noted that the prohibition against excessive bail was not the same 
thing as a guarantee that bail would be available at all,32 and rejected the 
claim that the amendment prohibited the government from pursuing its 
“admittedly compelling interests through the regulation of pretrial release.”33  
The majority’s reasoning is dubious in both of its key elements. As 
Professor Laura Appleman has argued, “the conditions of most pretrial 
detention differ little from punitive incarceration, subjecting these offenders 
to the worst of conditions without even a guilty verdict.”34 Appleman has 
likewise found the Court’s conclusions under the Eighth Amendment to be 
“undersupported at best.”35 But despite its analytic weaknesses, the Salerno 
decision continues to stand as a significant doctrinal barrier to constitutional 
abolition of pretrial detention. The consequences of allowing the practice to 
endure are particularly severe in this current era of COVID-19. Professor 
Carroll has summed up the realities that detainees face in stark terms: 
Inmates in jails are often housed in large dormitories or shared 
cells with poor ventilation. They are denied freedom of 
movement. They eat in large dining halls and share shower and 
toilet facilities. They lack access to adequate medical care, 
soap, cleaning supplies, and personal protective equipment 
like face masks or gloves. In addition, a greater percentage of 
detainees qualify as “high risk” for COVID-19 due to age and 
preexisting health conditions than the general population. 
Each of these factors compound the risk for infection, severe 
symptoms, and death.36 
And at the very moment when these unconvicted individuals are being 
exposed to increased risk of illness and death from COVID-19, they are also 
finding that states are citing the virus as a reason to extend the period of their 
detentions. Consider the case of Commonwealth v. Lougee.37 Although the 
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court (“SJC”) had ordered in April 2020 
that some pretrial detainees were entitled to a rebuttable presumption of 
release on personal recognizance as a result of the COVID pandemic, the 
court excepted individuals charged with a range of violent offenses as well 
as those found by a judge to pose a danger to the community.38 The SJC had 
also ordered that all criminal jury trials be continued until no earlier than 
 
31 Id. at 747. 
32 Id. at 752. 
33 Id. at 753. 
34 Laura I. Appleman, Justice in the Shadowlands: Pretrial Detention, Punishment, & the Sixth 
Amendment, 69 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1297, 1302 (2012). 
35 Id. at 1335. 
36 Carroll, supra note 16, at 62 (footnotes omitted). 
37 147 N.E.3d 464 (Mass. 2020). 
38 Comm. for Pub. Couns. Servs. v. Chief Just. of the Trial Ct., 142 N.E.3d 525, 530 (Mass. 2020). 
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September 2020.39 The combination of these two orders meant that some 
unconvicted individuals remained in custody during the height of the 
COVID crisis and that they stood to be detained under unsafe conditions for 
months to come until trials resumed. In Lougee, these months-long 
extensions also meant that the defendants would be held far longer than 
would ordinarily be permissible under state law; the Massachusetts statute 
authorizing pretrial detention for dangerousness provides that a defendant 
shall not be held on that basis for more than 180 days.40 According to these 
statutory limits on pretrial detention, the defendants in Lougee were entitled 
to be released in May 2020.41 Yet the SJC held that the period of delay 
occasioned by their order continuing jury trials was to be excluded from the 
time calculations under that statute.42 Consequently, the defendants could be 
held in custody under potentially hazardous health conditions for another 
four months—nearly twice as long as the maximum time period normally 
provided for under state law, and notwithstanding their 
constitutionally-mandated presumption of innocence.43  
III. AN ABOLITIONIST PATH FORWARD? 
The Lougee case vividly demonstrates both the costs of pretrial 
detention and the obstacles that unconvicted defendants face in challenging 
their confinement. It also serves as a reminder that the problems with pretrial 
detention go beyond problems with the bail system, for some pretrial 
detainees are not eligible for bail, even if they are in a position to afford it. 
Thus, as valuable as measures like community bail funds may be in 
supporting the abolitionist ethos,44 they are not sufficient to address the 
plight of those who have been deemed too dangerous to qualify for bail at 
all. Yet however grim the implications of Lougee may be for the defendants 
involved in the case itself, the decision may also suggest that there is an 
abolitionist path forward to be pursued in future cases. 
What might that abolitionist path look like? As noted above, federal 
constitutional law has not been interpreted in a way that is particularly 
hospitable to abolitionist claims—neither as a general matter45 nor in the 
 
39 Lougee, 147 N.E.3d at 468. 
40 MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 276, § 58A (2018). 
41 Lougee, 147 N.E.3d at 469–71. 
42 Id. at 472–74. 
43 In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 363 (1970) (describing presumption of innocence as “that bedrock 
axiomatic and elementary principle whose enforcement lies at the foundation of the administration of our 
criminal law”) (internal quotations omitted). 
44 See Jocelyn Simonson, Bail Nullification, 115 MICH. L. REV. 585, 589 (2017) (noting that some 
community bail funds “are run by mobilized grassroots groups intent on abolishing the criminal justice 
system as we know it”). 
45 See Roberts, supra note 1, at 71–99 (surveying and analyzing the Supreme Court’s “anti-abolition 
jurisprudence”). 
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narrower context of pretrial detention.46 Nevertheless, scholars have 
continued to develop arguments against the pretrial detention system that are 
grounded in federal constitutional principles and provisions. Professor Laura 
Appleman has advanced an argument rooted in the Sixth Amendment, 
contending that “the spirit of the Sixth Amendment jury trial right might 
apply to many pretrial detainees, due to both the punishment-like conditions 
of their incarceration and the unfair procedures surrounding bail grants, 
denials, and revocations.”47 Given that the Supreme Court has held that a 
right to a jury trial applies to offenses carrying a possible sentence of greater 
than six months,48 the Sixth Amendment argument would seem to be 
especially strong in cases like Lougee in which detainees are held for periods 
well beyond that temporal threshold without ever even having been 
convicted. Other arguments have focused on the Eighth Amendment’s Cruel 
and Unusual Punishment Clause. Professor Carroll has noted that the 
Supreme Court has recognized a prisoner’s right to necessary medical care, 
and has emphasized the logical applicability of this line of cases to pretrial 
detention in the time of COVID.49 Carroll acknowledges that the Court has 
distinguished pretrial detention from punishment but concludes that “it 
would seem odd that a detainee should have more rights after conviction 
than before. Rather it seems clear that a pretrial detainee, like 
post-conviction detainees, has a liberty interest in physical safety during 
periods of pretrial detention.”50  
As compelling as these federal constitutional arguments may be, they 
are probably not likely to be embraced by the Supreme Court’s conservative 
majority any time soon. But perhaps state courts like the Massachusetts SJC 
may step in to fill the gap. For even in the course of rejecting the detainees’ 
claims to automatic entitlement to release in Lougee, the court left open the 
possibility of release based on a reconsideration of each individual’s 
particular situation.51 The court suggested that “where the duration of 
pretrial confinement approaches or exceeds the length of sentence a 
defendant would be likely to receive if he or she were found guilty of the 
 
46 See supra notes 27–33 and accompanying text. 
47 Appleman, supra note 34, at 1303. While the extension of jury rights to pretrial detention hearings 
might well represent a significant improvement over current practices, it should be borne in mind that 
the jury system itself has long been fraught with issues of racial bias and injustice. See, e.g., Flowers v. 
Mississippi, 139 S. Ct. 2228, 2235 (2019) (overturning the conviction of a Black defendant who had been 
tried for murder six times by same lead prosecutor, during which the state used peremptory challenges 
to strike forty-one of forty-two Black prospective jurors); Roberts, supra note 1, at 96 (analyzing Flowers 
and discussing “the white supremacist logic behind keeping black people off juries” along with “the 
systemic role of all-white juries in preserving white domination of criminal punishment”). 
48 See Baldwin v. New York, 399 U.S. 66, 69 (1970) (“[W]e have concluded that no offense can be 
deemed ‘petty’ for purposes of the right to trial by jury where imprisonment for more than six months is 
authorized.”). 
49 Carroll, supra note 16, at 78–79. 
50 Id. at 79. 
51 Commonwealth v. Lougee, 147 N.E.3d 464, 476 (Mass. 2020).   
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crimes charged,” the reviewing judge should take that fact into account when 
assessing the equities of the case.52 With respect to the specific risks posed 
by COVID-19, the court noted that the health crisis might constitute a 
“material change in circumstances” favoring release, and indicated that 
judges should “consider the health risks to the defendant in determining 
whether there are conditions of release that will reasonably assure the safety 
of any other person or the community.”53 More broadly, the court also noted 
“that when the period during which a defendant is held awaiting trial is 
indefinitely prolonged, due process may require a hearing to determine 
whether the length of pretrial detention has become unreasonable.”54  
Admittedly, these potential avenues of relief are limited in scope and fall 
well short of guaranteeing release for the Lougee defendants. The court’s 
analysis falls far shorter still of calling the entire apparatus of pretrial 
detention into question. But at the same time, Lougee does suggest an 
openness on the part of the court to confront the practical consequences of 
pretrial detention and to acknowledge constitutional problems that the 
system creates. Lougee may therefore represent a small incremental step 
toward the larger goal of abolishing pretrial detention, which is itself an 
incremental step toward the ultimate goal of dismantling the carceral state. 
Moreover, it should be emphasized that state courts have sometimes 
taken the lead and moved far more decisively and quickly than the federal 
courts in matters of justice and equality. The Massachusetts SJC famously 
held that same-sex couples had a right to marry under the state constitution 
in Goodridge v. Dept. of Public Health,55 more than a decade before the U.S. 
Supreme Court recognized such a right under the Federal Constitution in 
Obergefell v. Hodges.56 In the context of criminal justice, the SJC has 
likewise shown a willingness to offer more robust protection to defendants 
than mandated under the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence.57 For example, the 
SJC has concluded that the state constitution “provides more substantive 
protection to criminal defendants than does the Fourth Amendment in the 
determination of probable cause,”58 and has opted to “reject the ‘totality of 
the circumstances’ test now espoused by a majority of the United States 
 
52 Id. at 475. 
53 Id. at 474–76. 
54 Id. at 476. 
55 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003). 
56 576 U.S. 644 (2015). 
57 See Herbert P. Wilkins, The Massachusetts Constitution—The Last Thirty Years, 44 SUFFOLK U. 
L. REV. 331, 345 (2011) (“By far, most cases in which Massachusetts has not followed the Supreme 
Court on constitutional issues have concerned the rights of criminal defendants.”). See also D. 
Christopher Dearborn, “You Have the Right to an Attorney,” But Not Right Now: Combating Miranda’s 
Failure by Advancing the Point of Attachment Under Article XII of the Massachusetts Declaration of 
Rights, 44 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 359, 394–98 (2011) (discussing criminal cases in which the SJC has 
offered greater protection to defendants than the Supreme Court). 
58 Commonwealth v. Upton, 476 N.E.2d 548, 556 (Mass. 1985). 
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Supreme Court. That standard is flexible but is also ‘unacceptably shapeless 
and permissive.’”59   
The SJC has also arguably done a better job than its federal counterpart 
in confronting some of the realities of race in criminal justice and in 
incorporating those realities into its jurisprudence. Take the example of an 
individual’s decision to avoid or flee from a police officer. The U.S. 
Supreme Court has described flight from a police officer as “the 
consummate act of evasion”60—an act that is “certainly suggestive” of 
wrongdoing and which may properly support an officer’s reasonable 
suspicion of criminal activity.61 While the SJC has not gone so far as to 
eliminate flight as a factor in evaluating police stops, the court has noted that 
where the fleeing suspect is a Black male, “the analysis of flight as a factor 
in the reasonable suspicion calculus cannot be divorced from the findings in 
a recent Boston Police Department . . . report documenting a pattern of racial 
profiling of black males in the city of Boston.”62 This report “suggests a 
reason for flight totally unrelated to consciousness of guilt”63—namely, the 
fleeing individual “might just as easily be motivated by the desire to avoid 
the recurring indignity of being racially profiled as by the desire to hide 
criminal activity.”64   
To be sure, these decisions themselves are not abolitionist in language 
or effect. At most, they suggest an openness to reforming rather than ending 
the modern prison-industrial complex. But the SJC’s candid 
acknowledgement of racial bias in the criminal justice system, combined 
with its history of breaking with federal constitutional law in the service of 
equality and inclusivity, may presage further movement in the direction of 
abolition in the future. Such movement is likely to be gradual, but most 
abolitionists recognize “that building a prisonless society is a long-term 
project involving incremental achievements.”65 And it is worth noting that 
the influence of abolitionist thought is spreading rapidly.66 There may thus 
be reason to hope that courts like the SJC will not always “be shackled to 




60 Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 124 (2000). 
61 Id. at 124–25. 
62 Commonwealth v. Warren, 58 N.E.3d 333, 342 (Mass. 2016). 
63 Id. 
64 Id.  
65 Roberts, supra note 1, at 108. 
66 See Introduction, 132 HARV. L. REV. 1568, 1571–72 (2019) (discussing abolition’s 
“unmistakable surge in influence”). 
67 Roberts, supra note 1, at 105. 
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CONCLUSION 
Prison abolition is not about the immediate dismantling of prison walls 
and the unleashing of dangerous convicted persons on an unprotected 
populace.68 It is rather a constructive and aspirational movement, one which 
“entails an array of alternative nonpenal regulatory frameworks and an ethic 
that recognizes the violence, dehumanization and moral wrong inherent in 
any act of caging or chaining—or otherwise controlling by penal force—
human beings.”69 The abolition of pretrial detention can be an important 
incremental step toward this aspirational goal. The costs to detainees and 
their communities are grave, the racial and class-based inequities are severe, 
and the inconsistencies with the presumption of innocence and other 
constitutional values are manifold.  
But what of the truly dangerous among us? Abolitionism does not 
necessarily deny that there may be a “dangerous few” who require some 
degree of constraint for public safety.70 Yet the number of such persons is 
likely to be vanishingly small relative to the total number of the 
incarcerated,71 and pretrial detainees have not even had their 
“dangerousness” assessed in a full trial before a jury of their peers.72 At most, 
the existence of some number of dangerously violent individuals should 
militate in favor of a narrow exception to a general rule of decarceration.73 
Existing federal constitutional doctrine is not likely to lead to such a 
general rule in the foreseeable future. But there may be a role for state 
constitutional law to play, as evidenced by the willingness of courts like the 
Massachusetts SJC to recognize the racial inequities in criminal justice and 
to afford greater protection for the rights of criminal defendants. Perhaps 
these state courts will prove to be the strategically firmer ground upon which 
abolitionists can “build a more humane and democratic society that no 
longer relies on caging people to meet human needs and solve social 
 
68 See id. at 114 (noting that “[n]o abolitionist expects all prison walls to come tumbling down at 
once”); see also McLeod, supra note 5, at 1172 (explaining that “[a]bolition is not a simple call for an 
immediate opening or tearing down of all prison walls”). 
69 McLeod, supra note 5, at 1172. 
70 Id. at 1168–91. 
71 See id. (arguing that “there are many millions of the one in thrity five American adults presently 
living under criminal supervision who fall outside any such small category [of the dangerous few] that 
may exist.”). 
72 Moreover, defendants who have been detained pretrial may not be any more dangerous than other 
individuals who do not happen to have been accused of criminal activity, which raises further questions 
of justice and equity. See Sandra G. Mayson, Dangerous Defendants, 127 YALE L.J. 490, 499 (2018) 
(arguing that “[t]he parity principle holds that the state has no greater authority to preventively restrain a 
defendant than it does a non-defendant who poses an equal risk”).   
73 See McLeod, Prison Abolition and Grounded Justice, supra note 5, at 1171 (arguing that “even 
if a person is so awful in her violence that the threat she poses must be forcibly contained, this course of 
action ought to be undertaken with moral conflict, circumspection, and even shame, as a choice of the 
lesser of two evils, rather than an achievement of justice”). 
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problems”74 and in which they can “imagine a new freedom constitutionalism 
to guide and govern the radically different society they are creating.”75 
 
74 Roberts, supra note 1, at 7–8. 
75 Id. at 122. 
 
 
 
